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TRANSFORMATION — PRACTICAL LESSONS
Greg Padula
C5T Corp
Shiloh, IL
This paper will provide a glimpse into the transformation of the Tanker Airlift Control Center (TACC) between
1997 and 2003. It will provide my perspective and lessons as the functional lead during that time. It does not necessarily represent an official position.
tions became an imperative with the changing threat
and the requirement to adapt to civilian Air Traffic
Management (ATM) Constraints. But with the changing threat, international airspace congestion, and reduced manning of our aircrews, all coupled with the
need to better use our resources (aircraft and aircrews), it was clear that obstacles to obtaining our
operational need had to be addressed.

Introduction

The Catalyst
In the past, many within AMC had recognized that
becoming more efficient was good, but not imperative (because of the tremendous success record of
AMC and the TACC). The new studies of airspace
and AMC leadership
A Must do, do not wait
made it a must do.
another day – AMC/CC
Then Brig Gen Wil-

Figure 1. The TACC facility – Part of the M2K
transformation
The TACC commands and controls 1200+ aircraft
and 600+ mission per day to 50 plus countries per
day. The command and control (C2) functions are
diverse: from regularly scheduled missions much like
an airline, to “irregular operations” such as contingency missions, training missions, scientific missions
to the Antarctic, rescue missions around the world, as
well as classified, presidential support, and Air Refueling (AR) missions.

liam Welser (now retired Lt Gen) hired Delta Airlines (DAL) for a short study of the TACC. The study
produced what the expected – there is much room for
improvement. Then Brig Gen Duncan McNabb (now
AMC Commander) assumed command of the TACC
and said “the planets are aligning;” it is time to move
out on a transformation path. He hired DAL back for
phase 2 and appointed me as the operational project
lead in the TACC transformation – that we now
named TACC 2000. Lt Gen Woody Hogle supported many hard decisions such as data link. The
support of Gen Tony Robertson, then AMC Commander, can be summed up in his words, “This is a
must do, do not wait
I. Building the Team
another day.”
II. Building the Vision
III. Implementing
How We Organized

A small group of visionary TACC and Air Mobility
Command (AMC) Commanders set the TACC and
the Air Mobility Command on a transformation venture called TACC 2000, M2K, and M21. This effort
leveraged the best practices of industry through collaboration with various airline and distribution operations centers and continuing with the hiring of Delta
Airlines to help lay the ground work. This paper will
provide some insights from the operational and project lead perspectives. It will describe the reason for
change (the problem), the catalyst for change, how
we organized, some of the results of the effort, as
well as provide some lessons observed that could be
applied to other transformations and change.

It required I. Building the team, II. Building the vision, and III. Implementing.
I. Building the team

The Problem

Lean - matrixed - integrated team. Many practical
constraints drove the effort, such as resources (e.g.,
money and people). Initially the TACC 2000 initiative started with 2 full-time people and leadership
support to transform the TACC. Then BG McNabb

The Problem that drove the transformation stems
mainly from the need to work in a peace and wartime
global environment – dynamically. Dynamic opera-
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worked closely at the deputy division chief level to
vet ideas, build solutions, and in the process build a
significant amount of trust which indirectly translated
change management and progress. If vetted through
the Deputy level, working at the Colonel level became much easier.

made a partnership with the AMC technical directorate (AMC SC: Col Mel Flack). Col Flack assigned
Col Terry Williams as the lead for the technical part
of the transformation. Col Williams led the
technical end, I led the functional end. We both
formed a small office to build the functional and
technical views together.
The Team
Core Team FIO-SIO: Leverage and
- FIO-SIO
integrate functional and technical
- Council of Colonels
efforts. These 2 offices (Functional
- Global Partners
Integration Office (Lt Col Chris
- Leadership
Stuhldreher) and System Integration
- Informal Structure
Office (Lt Bill Col Sweger) (FIO- Feedback Structure
SIO) met daily to build a plan, solve
issues, and implement various solutions to fill our
capability gaps. These integration offices had charters
that required participation from the rest of the staff in
AMC. A key advantage of the FIO and SIO was to
leverage current processes and resources to into a
focused effort to implement the “Capabilities”
needed for the M2K vision. These Integration offices
grew to about 10 people each – but they leveraged
and focused many efforts both in AMC,
USTRANSCOM, and other AF, DOD, and Civil
Aviation organizations (like FAA and Eurocontrol).
The organization did not grow; the manning was reallocated from other areas.
FIO: Single Source of requirements; SIO: Enterprise
system look. A chartered task of the FIO was to be
the single source of requirements for the transformation. (It was later recognized that the TACC was often leading transformation for the command (AMC)
and that was not the role of an execution organization. Prior to the FIO, there was not a single voice
for TACC requirements. Anyone that had a requirement went direct to the functional managers for the
systems and advocated for their desire (not necessarily even a valid requirement). Similarly, to the FIO,
the SIO became the single source to insert cross cutting requirements into systems – an enterprise view.
Because of the close relationship between the SIO
and the FIO, technical reality was quickly brought
into the equation of transforming the TACC. The
close and frequent interaction (daily) between the
FIO and SIO and at the O6 level eliminated a lot of
staffing and posturing. It produced trust and a vision
that could be implemented (vision with practicality).

Global Partners for MAF Transformation: It
was clear very early on that global partnerships
or at least cooperation was required for the
Mobility Air Force (MAF) global mission. The
question was how large to make the network
before we would get bogged down. I decided
to work internal to the key MAF Command
and Control (C2) Colonel (O6) leadership in
Europe and the Pacific as well as key Colonels in the
Guard and Reserves. These key stakeholders were
involved in each key decision. Europe was pivotal
because increased civil air traffic congestion was
delaying TACC operational missions. On the other
hand, the Pacific covered the largest physical area of
MAF C2 and had different issues. These leaders not
only provided insight to the processes we were building but provided requirements (and some money) for
AMC C2 systems. This process not only captured
good ideas and innovation by these global experts
(and their teams), it made AMC and TACC processes
much better for less money. We were able to capture
great innovation that was occurring in Europe by
such folks as then Majors Tom Nunamaker and
Tom Manley.
Leadership: It is clear that the leadership was an integral part of the transformation team (Gen Robertson, Gen McNabb, Gen Welser, Gen Mike Wooley to
name a few) as well as the others I have mentioned.
They helped form and validate the vision and its implementation and their leadership was essential in
overcoming many roadblocks / resistance to change.
It is amazing that even with four-star general officer
direction there was significant resistance.
Informal structure: We had a “brain trust” of people
that were visionary and practical. They were often in
O6 leadership positions – but not always. This informal team included visionary folks in the Europe, the
Pacific, and USTRANSCOM (some of the individuals involved include Col Nick Sipos, Col Paul Williams, and Col Roger Warnick). This small group of
individuals allowed the team to come up with acceptable transformational ideas and projects that could be
refined and implemented across the global structure.

Council of Colonels: Part of our decision body was a
Council of Colonels that met monthly. These were
key TACC stakeholders that would be responsible for
implementing their piece of the solution (most of
which were cross domain issues – i.e., beyond these
leaders own span of control). Additionally, we

Feedback Structure -- M2K Advocates: M2K “advocates” were key members of the team that not only
provided feedback on all aspects of M2K they were
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our eyes and ears and were able to capture the innovation at the unit level. Furthermore, these advocates
provided a solid connection to the user in all the areas
we could think of (including aircrew, to C2, base
operations, airfield management, and maintenance).
As you can see, “advocate” does not adequately describe their role. We carefully selected them to be
diverse, grounded, trusted at the unit, and visionary.
Then we trained them formally on the vision and how
to help facilitate and influence its implementation.
II. Building the vision – with “practicality”

Figure 3. Integrated Flight Management is a subset
of Mobility 21

Vision greater than TACC: It did not take long to
recognize the vision required for the TACC to operate in a global dynamic environment was much bigger than the TACC. However, it also made sense for
the operations which needed the change to drive the
vision and its implementation. The vision evolved
very quickly to 3 high level goals. Just by establishing and communicating these goals, we were able to
identify many aspects to implement the vision.

Cross Domain Solutions: We considered many areas for
improvement but especially across these 3 domains: 1)
Military Command and Control (peace and contingency
locations), 2) Domestic and International Civil Air Traffic Management, and 3) the Aircrew crew.
III. Implementing
The approach: The solution was a revolutionary
change in a mostly evolutionary way. We did this
mainly in a “Crawl, Walk, Run” manner. It required
“Vision with practicality.” Leadership support and
change management were more important the more
revolutionary the change. We focused on results relatively quickly. We worked the longer term items, but
used the success of the short term implementations to
keep momentum. Approach was capabilities based,
used common sense and had just enough analysis to
make good decisions (see lessons observed).

EXPANDING THE VISION -(Crawl, Walk, Run)
International Environment
International
Environment
PACOM,EUCOM,
EUCOM,CENTCOM,
CENTCOM …
PACOM,
USTRANSCOM
USTRANSCOM
Industry
Industry
AFC2ISRC
AC2ISRC
AFRL

MAF
AMC
Staff
AMC
AC2ISRC
DO’s
DOStaff

ESC
ESC
ASC
EuroControl
FAA
FAA/CAA

Goal 2: Seamless Systems that provided “information
at the fingertips” of the decision makers.

Capabilities Management (C-R-r): The entire process we built was structured around implementing the
M2K Capability (C) – which remained our focus. To
obtain that Capability, we often had to fill enterprise
(cross domain / or
Managing Implementation
multi-systems)
Re- Capabilities Focused
quirements (R), and
- Common Sense
finally we had to work
- Practical
with the traditional
- Implementation Focused
requirements process
that works individual requirements (r) through Functional
Managers
and
then
Systems’
Program Managers.

Goal 3: Assured connectivity – We needed this so we
could have collaboration among the decision makers.
We needed links between multiple ground nodes as
well as air nodes.

The solution: The solution was multi-prong. It was
about developing and managing the capability needed
to respond in all global environments verses building/improving a system or communication path.

CAF

TACC

NORAD
TSA

Integrity - Service - Excellence

Figure 2. TACC Capability requires a cross domain
solutions – and an International and Joint perspective
Goal1: Seamless Processes – this included many
cross domain processes. It was always process first.
We built an “as is” and then a “to be” process.
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could only be done with someone bridging the Ops –
tech gap. Visionary and dedicated people like Steve
Hofmann often brought operational changes to the
developer nightly. This provided the template for the
information that the Flight Manager needed to manage missions dynamically and globally. Once we
built the view we needed we went about trying to fill
the holes in data that we had. It needed to gather information from 9 different systems.

DOTMLPF: We looked at Doctrine, Organizational,
Training, Material, Leadership, Process, and Facility
(DOTMLPF) as potential solutions. Each of these
areas was part of our potential solution set. This is
common in AF solutions.
The roadmap: We built a roadmap with 371 items.
The visibility of this helped keep the implementations
on track. This was tracked on multiple levels on a
daily basis by the FIO-SIO. They identified the issues
that were not meeting expectations / milestones were
highlighted.

The M2K transformation resulted in several spin offs
including the Velocity Initiative (VI). VI goals were
mainly to move the mission faster. We used a similar
method of transformation to drive this initiative, appointing a lead and leveraging M2K advocates from
across the US, Europe, and the Pacific. We held several face-to-face meetings, built and coordinated an
implementation plan, and then tracked implementation through the M2K process / team structure. These
efforts are still ongoing. VI and M2K are being institutionalized into AMC’s Capabilities processes.

Decision points: The highlighted issues were solved
at the lowest level possible, often at the FIO-SIO or
the technical and function leads. If not resolved there
they were brought to the Council of Colonels and on
semi-annual basis to the General Officer Steering
group (GOSG). This GOSG was led by the AMC
Commander and attended by many AMC General
Officers at Headquarters AMC and USTRANSCOM
and many field locations attended by VTC.

Lessons Observed
Collaboration: We used many forms to collaborate
within our team including regular face-to-face meeting, telephone, and the web to gather/distribute information.

The Right Team: Not too big, but diverse and representative. Look for knowledge, experience, openness,
influence, and passion. The right people will work
much more efficiently. Build a team diverse enough
to link to every level, but that is lean enough to processes decisions relatively quickly. Consider using a
structure like M2K, including the FIO-SIO, formal
and informal network, Brain Trust, and advocates.
There must be a Champion at the top and at multiple
levels. AMC/CC active support was essential, but
without other advocates at many levels it would have
failed. The collective team support not only manages
and implements elements of M2K, but also changes
the underlying organizational culture.
Vision with Practicality: Build the vision, morph it,
but stay focused on the practical. We did not shoot
for the 100% solution or 100% information to make
decisions. We knew that perfect information cost
infinite dollars and time. Furthermore, the solution
that we wanted was often a long-term solution. But
there were many solutions that were lower risk and
less expensive that would allow us to move forward.
Do not compromise the long-term vision, but review
the technical and financial risks to see if it is practical
to implement in the needed timeframe. Also consider
what is impractical for one level of authority may be
practical at a higher level of authority. AMC CC and
the support he garnered at the Air Staff allowed implementation not possible at our level. It was our job
to understand when to pass the baton up to
our bosses.

Figure 4. Systems view from requirements to billing
The Results
This effort moved the TACC (and PACAF and
USAFE C2 structure) from mostly a mission monitoring and management by exception organization to
a proactive mission and sortie management organization. Initial Capability was stood up in about a year
and a half of start. The close partnership between the
Operations and technical community allowed us to
have 62 builds of our integrated management tool
and prototype in use in an operational environment in
12 weeks. The speed and functionality of this effort
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Targeted Analysis: In determining practicality do not
have analysis paralysis. The amount of objective and
subjective analysis varies depending on risk and other
factors. We performed our big picture analysis using
the common sense of the experts -- “grey beards” of
our internal group. Detailed analysis was occasionally needed to take us from the big picture, common
sense view to a more rigorous analytic view that
would stand up to the budget process scrutiny. For
example we performed economic analyses (EA) that
help justify the eventual cost in the hundreds of million dollars. The “rigorous analytical” conclusions
were essentially the same that our internal group derived, but we now had rigorous justification that
would stand up in many forums.

PTSOP (Put This Stuff On Paper). AMC DO (then
Maj Gen Brady) said this. It is a true statement and a
good lesson. Document it on paper early. Once on
paper, even if it initially misses the mark, it will
evolve into the desired document as people use this
paper strawman as a collaborative tool.
Manage the Capabilities / Obstacles. Understand the
end game, build a roadmap with a plan, and then do
not lose focus. Everything else is an obstacle to get
the capability. Each capability should have a person
who is primarily responsible (OPR) and a small
group that that will be accountable to the management team. In that process, we identified obstacles to
completion. At that point, it a large part of our effort
was on obstacle management.

Streamline processes to implementation. Do what is
required, but think outside the box to satisfy the reA capabilities look at implementation is often inconquirements without extra work. Initial feedback from
gruent with traditional DOD acquisition -- which is
staff members indicated that to do this transformation
systems based. In this new method, we focused on
we would need many requirements documents that
the vision first, then process then solutions. To make
would take years to build. Our answer was to build a
this work efficiently we found that a tightly knit team
“Detailed Requirements Matrix”
of operations and technical manthat cross referenced every reagement allowed much greater effiLessons Learned
quirement we had to other apcient and effective results.
- The Right Team
proved documents.
This saved
- Vision with Practicality
over a year and kept momentum.
Roadmap/Visibility/Accountability:
- PTSOP
There was some resistance to this
These were essential to this man- Manage Capability
approach, as with many things that
agement process. We started with
- Roadmap/Visibility/Accountability
were different.
the Capability (and individual func- Tight Decision Loop
tionalities) and built a roadmap to
- Targeted Analysis
Bridge the Operational and Techfill each. Visibility of each of these
- Bridge the Ops – Tech Gap
nical gap. These are often sepamilestones / actions items brought
- Leverage work / resources
rate worlds with separate lanthe appropriate attention and en- Manage / Focus on the seams
guages that truly need a bridge to
hanced accountability. Visibility
- Momentum-Continuity
garner the best of both worlds.
occurred at every level depending on
- Communication / Feedback
The technical experts include systhe issue. Daily interactions, weekly
- Change Management/Culture
tem builders, communication speweb postings, quarterly Colonel
- Manage Risk
cialist, technologist, comptroller,
meetings, General Officer Steering
as well as acquisition specialist. The operators inGroup, and finally about every 6 months we briefed
clude AOC/C2 controllers, planners, flyers, mainthe AMC CC and much of his staff. Just knowing that
tainers, and any user of technical areas. The misunareas would be highlighted at each level encouraged
derstanding between the 2 main groups creates
them to be fixed. Progress was enhanced at each
huge obstacles to progress. Bridge the gap and
level. At last count there were 371 items that we
focusing on the seams allows one to leverage the best
were tracking in the roadmap for implementation.
of both worlds.
Tight Decision Loop: Consider a blended team like the
Leverage existing work and resources. Do not reFIO-SIO. They added creditability, visibility, and solved
invent wheels (unless required). We leveraged much
many of the problems very quickly. Have leadership
including AMC, USAFE, PACAF, FAA, DOT,
with authority at the meetings if possible. Use meetings
EUROcontrol, and more. We leveraged bright ideas
with a focused end in mind -- brain storming, talk about
from airmen to Generals. For the long term areas, we
differences, and set action items /plans ahead. Keep
used traditional processes and built a strong partneraccountability. Follow up on action items and publish to
ship with the AF Research Labs. We partnered with
the authorities – include the plan and who is accountthe labs (built an MOU in 1999 to institutionalize
able. I recommend a “Brain Trust” and network to keep
AFRL as part of the long term technology infusion
you grounded and to facilitate the decision process.
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overt and covert resistance to the change. Some felt
change was a threat to their way of life, others
thought there were dangers in the change. We listened very carefully and addressed each concern or
changed our implementation plan. In some cases, the
resistance defied logic and in those cases we worked
to overcome it. We used personal interaction, lowest
level supervisor involvement. Many decisions were
resolved at the FIO-SIO or Colonel level, but there
were major issues that required AMC CC involvement. Consequently we provided a Program Management Review about every 6 months to the AMC
CC and his staff as well as a VTC for the remote
MAF General Officers. These very high level forums
garnered decisions we needed. Authorization to
change the flight management process, add government positions for flight managers, add data link for
C2 to the AMC plan were decided at these high level
meetings. Documented support helps change the culture. When M2K was identified as a Command priority, it could be used to help justify dollars for the
programs. M2K then became an excuse for innovation. The culture appeared to be changing. Culture
change is slow - years. Often some of the biggest
changes I saw were in people who experienced the
benefits of M2K in the field. When they returned to
headquarters, they became positive change agents.

into the TACC on a regular basis). The move to
“flight management” leveraged best business practices of airlines dispatch. In doing this, we used the
AMC requirements process and helped focus AMC
resources on what AMC leadership said were command priorities. This refocus was not always appreciated or understood by those that were required to
change. We also used the traditional method of coordinating -- Staffing. This formal method will produce
a coordinated position and will surely be signed out
as it goes up the chain. Staffing went much easier
because of the team we had.
Manage / focus on the seams. Most of what we need
exists, but is not available across the enterprise. Even
if an 80% solution is some where else, it is less expensive to expand and leverage that capability than
reinvent it internally. Managing the seams can save
huge money and provide quicker and better solutions
to deliver more capability. These seams include the
process and systems seams.
Momentum- Continuity: Support and progress is
exponential to momentum. Do not lose momentum
unless there is a real show stopper, but realize the
consequences. Understand the slow down and address at the appropriate level. Do not hesitate to go to
leadership as needed. Keep the faith with the team. If
you need to go to leadership ideally coordinate with
your trusted team leaders, but at least inform them.
On several occasions we went forward without full
concurrence and occasionally “broke traditional
glass.” I am convinced this was needed for progress
including implementing dispatch like capability. If
you just work the long term, you will probably lose
momentum, so, work the long term areas under the
“cloak” of short-term successes.

Manage Risk -- not avoid it. Risk avoidance mindset
is incongruent with revolutionary transformation.
Often as we improve one thing something else suffers. E.g., if security increases it may reduce the capability elsewhere. The most secure computer is one
you do not turn on and the safest airplane is one you
do not fly (unless you are being shot at). Our great
operational/technical team was able to balance risk.
Summary

Continuity of the vision keepers and change agents is
important to implementation. When the continuity is
broken, the change will seek the steady state of the
culture. Hence, it is important to change the culture
to one of continuous process improvement.

This short paper certainly did not do justice to the
M2K transformation. The success was a tribute to
many who worked way beyond what was expected. It
was a lean and agile transformation with many factors that contributed to its success some of which
were mentioned in this paper. The M2K lessons can
be applied to many other situations especially those
with dynamic changes like in DoD and Industry.

Communications / feedback: Have a detailed Communication plan ranging from face-to-face exchange,
advertising, briefings, newspaper and magazine articles, web portals, and other multi-media type events
as well as incorporation of the ideas in the Command’s policy and presentations including Command
video. The advocates provided a great feedback
mechanism. General and targeted “prototype feedback to users (e.g., crews, flight managers) was significant. We also provided our feedback to them.
Change Management / Culture: Plan for and have an
aggressive Change Management plan. There was
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